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MEMORANDUM

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TO : S - The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S *[initials]*

FROM: EUR - Roy D. Renken *[initials]*

SUBJECT: Draft Letter to Chancellor Adenauer

May 20, 1956

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I believe that the draft of your message to Chancellor Adenauer will be helpful in clearing up some of the misapprehensions revealed by his conversation with Ambassador Bruce after your talk with Foreign Minister von Brentano at Copenhagen. However, the draft does not deal with one point which is important in the development of our discussions with the U.S.S.R. with regard to a possible Summit meeting. The Chancellor is taking the position that the agenda of a meeting should consist of two subjects: (1) Disarmament, and (2) "General Relaxation of Tension." He feels that the second item would enable us to raise the question of German reunification without specifically mentioning it. If he continues to take this position publicly, as he did in the Hearst interview, it will greatly complicate our negotiations with the Soviets through the Ambassadors in Moscow.

I am not entirely clear how this point could be dealt with in the draft. Perhaps it could be taken care of by adding to the paragraph ending at the top of page 12 something like the following lines:

"I think we must take the position that any new Summit meeting must begin where the last one ended. Although we need not be rigid about the wording of the agenda, this thought should be reflected in some way in our agenda proposals. This is, of course, a subject which the three Ambassadors in Moscow will be discussing with the Soviet Government in the next few weeks."

Enclosure:

Draft Letter to Chancellor Adenauer.

Enclosures:

1 - Mr. *[initials]* *R*

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cc to S
1. F. H. [unclear]
2. C. [unclear]
3. S. [unclear]

May 22, 1958

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My good friend:

When I was in Berlin, Ambassador Bruce reported to me his talk with you of May 9 and gave me the memorandum which you had prepared. Needless to say, I have studied this memorandum with the closest attention because the subjects are of transcendent importance. Since then I have also received from Ambassador Bruce a brief cabled report of his further talk with you of May 15.

I should like, if I may, to give you my own thinking on some of these problems.

With respect to disarmament, it is my profound conviction that little of real significance can be achieved to reduce or limit armaments unless tension is reduced. The complexities of modern power, nuclear and conventional, are so great, and the trickery of the Communists so amply demonstrated, that it is extremely difficult to find any dependable formulation.

Lenin said:

the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable. That means that if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to hold sway, it must prove its capacity to do so by military organization also."

There is no reason whatsoever to believe that the Communist group that now rules the Sino-Soviet bloc has departed in the least from that view.

His Excellency

Dr. Konrad Adenauer

Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Bonn

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of Lenin. It means that we must have sufficient military capacity to deter attack.

I do not, however, feel that there is no hope of bringing about reductions of armament. The cost alone is mounting at so astronomical a rate as to constitute a heavy drain on the Soviet Union and its capacity to develop economically. On our side, the burden is also heavily felt, although the far greater productive capacity of the West makes the burden relatively less grievous on our people.

It seems to me, however, that a condition precedent to important progress in reduction of armament is progress toward the solution of some of the most dangerous political situations, notably the partition of Germany, and the establishment, in areas of particularly strategic importance, of systems of inspection which will give a large measure of insurance against massive surprise attack and contribute greatly to preventing war by accident, or through miscalculation of each other's intentions.

I understand full well that the Federal Republic does not want to seem to be in the position of blocking disarmament by demanding first a reunification of Germany. If you were put in that position, you could be, and undoubtedly would be, severely criticized. However, may it not be permissible for governments like our own to state our concern that significant limitation of armament will not, in fact, be achieved unless the atmosphere is cleared by the solution of some of the grave political problems, notably the partition of Germany, and by the establishment of insurance against massive surprise attack or war by accident which, under present conditions, could amount to almost instant annihilation of whole nations?

We have made a careful historical study of all past efforts at disarmament, and I myself have had considerable personal contact with such efforts, beginning with my attendance at the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1867, participation in the Versailles conferences, etc. I think it is demonstrable that reduction of armament comes almost automatically when there is a reduction of fear, and of the likelihood of war. On the other hand, reductions do not occur in an atmosphere of fear and danger, and a feeling that armament is needed to preserve national existence as against those who seek world domination.

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It seems to me that our position should be that we want to control and reduce armaments. We are quite willing to do so without regard to political settlements. But we doubt that any far-reaching formulas can be found unless the atmosphere is cleared by progress toward political settlements and a reduction of the danger of massive surprise attack or of war by accident.

You touch on the interconnection of nuclear and conventional armament. I quite agree that it would profit us little if limitation of armament occurred under conditions which assured the Sino-Soviet Communist bloc domination of the Eurasian continent by means of its vast manpower superiority. On the other hand, perhaps Chinese manpower need not be counted in, and then the population disparity largely disappears, particularly since the Eastern European countries can hardly be counted on by the Soviets as dependable allies.

I doubt, however, that this problem can ever be effectively dealt with by simply attempting to equate numbers of men in the armed forces. Let us take the assumption that there is to be a quota of two million soldiers per 200 million inhabitants. Such a formula, however, is only a beginning. Does it equally apply to China? What is the training and capability of reserve manpower? How quickly could reserves be brought into active forces and what weapons are held in readiness for this? Where would they be located, near to or far from staging areas for attack? Would so-called "police" forces or the armed guards of political subdivisions, as distinct from "national" forces be counted? If not counted, then the "quota" could readily be upset by subterfuges in this respect. All of these problems were futilely dealt with by the Versailles Treaty and the subsequent years of Geneva disarmament talks.

That does not mean that we ignore the problem of conventional forces and manpower. In this connection, it should, I think, be borne in mind that there is no prospect that nuclear weapons will be abolished so far as we now foresee. The scientists and technicians both of the Soviet Union and of the West are in agreement that, while future production of fissionable material can be controlled, there is no way to assure the non-military use of significant amounts of fissionable material already produced. You may recall the statement in the Soviet disarmament proposal of May 10, 1955. It reads as follows:

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"There are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control. In such a situation the security of the States signatory to the international convention can not be guaranteed, since the possibility would be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise atomic attack on peace-loving states.

"Until an atmosphere of trust has been created in relations between States, any agreement on the institution of international control can only serve to lull the vigilance of the peoples. It will create a false sense of security, while in reality there will be a danger of the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons and, hence, the threat of surprise attack and the unleashing of an atomic war with all its appalling consequences for the people."

While steps may be taken to stop the future production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world, I think it can be said with confidence that there will not be anything approaching total nuclear disarmament. That is true irrespective of whether our own various disarmament proposals are interdependent or separable. Thus, out of existing stocks, nuclear weapons of smaller range and free of significant fissionable fallout may increasingly be made available to the forces of NATO, so that their defensive capacity will be greatly increased and may tend to make population disparities, and disparities in numbers of ground forces, of less significance.

I note your reference to Dr. von Brentano's report, which could be interpreted to mean that the United States intended to conduct bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on the subject of armament, without regard to our allies. I regret it if I gave any such impression. You will recall that last June there was occasion for clarification of the United States procedures in this respect, and there has been no alteration whatever of the position then taken and since pursued. I believe that what

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I said to Dr. von Brentano was that the Soviet Union has had plenty of opportunities to indicate to the United States a sincere purpose to arrive at some significant military or political arrangements but that no such indications had been received. I cited that, not as indicating a desire or willingness on our part to negotiate bilaterally with the Soviet Union, but merely as evidence of a lack of desire on the part of the Soviet Union to make genuine progress. You can be sure, my dear Chancellor, that the United States is not going to negotiate an disarmament behind the back of the Federal Republic.

With respect to a "~~Summit meeting~~", we welcome such a meeting if it seems that it will serve any useful purpose. We do not, however, want to have it if it will only serve to give the West a false illusion of security, or if it would enable the Soviet Union to divide the West, or if it would increase the risk of war by bringing unresolved issues to a sharp point.

You will also, I know, take into account that the position of the President of the United States is somewhat different from that of the European Heads of Government. The President of the United States is the Head of State. He normally discharges governmental duties through Cabinet members. For example, the President himself never appears before the Congress other than perhaps once a year to make a formal address to the Congress in joint session under conditions of great dignity and respect. He never participates personally in any parliamentary debates or the like. The American people do not like to see him, in foreign conferences, assuming a role which is considered unavailing for him here at home. There is a long tradition against that and the exceptions are generally considered to have proved the soundness of the usual practice. The leadership of both our political Parties opposes the President's going to the "Summit" and the Democrat opposition is vigorous.

As our most recent NATO communique said, Summit conferences are not the only means, and not necessarily the best means, for negotiating agreements with the Communist states. The Korean Armistice, the Indochina Armistice, the Austrian State Treaty, were none of them negotiated with the direct participation of the President of the United States. The only conference with the Soviets in which President Eisenhower participated, that is the Geneva Summit Conference, led to unsatisfactory results in

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that the Soviets now repudiate the three significant agreements of that conference, namely the agreed "close link between the reunification of Germany and the problems of European security", the "common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany", and the agreement that "the reunification of Germany by means of free elections * * * shall be carried out". It is to be recalled that Mr. Khrushchev was an important, indeed dominant, member of the Soviet Delegation which made these agreements at the Summit.

There, dear Mr. Chancellor, are my somewhat rambling thoughts with respect to the important matters which were dealt with in your memorandum. There are no easy solutions and we may indeed face a new and grave complication resulting from the developments in France, which cause us, as they must cause you, much concern. However, as I said to Dr. von Brentano, one of the important and solid elements in the situation is the large degree of good will between our countries and peoples, and the confidence and trust which, I like to feel, exists between you and me personally. You have expressed this on many occasions and you have reexpressed it in the final paragraph of your memorandum which Ambassador Bruce gave me. Surely it is, as you say, a sign of friendship that we speak, as we do, frankly and with candor. I think we could do even more to build concretely on the solid base that exists between our governments.

Faithfully yours,

JFK
John Foster Dulles

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